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I. Some systematic observations of introduction
According to art. 50 para. 2 TFEU, once the UK has notified its intention to
withdraw, the Union with its remaining 27 Member States (EU 27) shall
negotiate and conclude an agreement with the UK, setting out the arrange-
ments for the UK’s withdrawal. Art. 50 para. 3 TFEU says that the Treaties
shall cease to apply to the UK from the date of entry into force of the with-
drawal agreement or, failing that, after the lapse of the period of negotiation of
two years or such longer period as unanimously agreed. There are in my view
several consequences from that express Treaty provision. First, since the
Treaties cease to apply even if there is no agreement on the withdrawal
arrangements, it is the unilateral notification of withdrawal that must legally be
seen to trigger the withdrawal with all its consequences, and not the agreement
on the withdrawal arrangements. Second, UK and EU 27 are free to extend
unanimously the two years period for negotiating the agreement on the
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arrangements of withdrawal. Third, they are not free to stipulate in such
agreement that certain provisions of the Treaties are for all future (and not
merely transitionally) exempted from the express stipulation in art. 50
para. 3 TFEU that the Treaties cease to apply. If the content of certain provi-
sions of the Treaties is to continue to be applicable after the UK’s withdrawal
has become effective, such continuing applicability can only follow from the
agreement on the future relationship between UK and EU 27 as envisaged in
art. 50 para. 2 TFEU. Thus one clear effect from Brexit (in the narrow sense of
the withdrawal by UK) will be that the Treaties in their entirety are no longer
applicable to the UK.
As regards the time post withdrawal, the arrangements for the withdrawal by
the UK according to art. 50 para. 2 TFEU shall take account of the framework
of the future relationship between the UK and the EU – the effect of Brexit in
the wider sense of the new relationship that is to replace the present EU
membership. That has several consequences. It is not the future relationship in
its entirety, with all the many detailed provisions it will encompass, but only
the framework thereof that is to be taken into account. To turn this framework
into a detailed agreement that covers the entirety of the future relationship
between UK and EU 27 will require difficult and time consuming negotia-
tions. This is why art. 50 para. 2 TFEU states that the agreement on the
arrangements for withdrawal shall only take into account the framework of
the future relationship and does not have to include a full agreement on all of
the future relationship with all its details. This means that there will in all
likelihood be a time gap between the date when the UK’s withdrawal becomes
effective and the Treaties cease to be effective on the one hand and on the other
hand the date when the agreement on the future UK/EU 27 relationship
becomes effective.
The framework for the future relationship determines which transitional pro-
visions will be needed in the withdrawal agreement. The more progress on the
future relationship the parties make during the negotiation period of two years
(or longer if extended), the better the basis for defining the provisions of
transition.
Art. 50 paras. 2 and 3 TFEU, of course, do not rule out the possibility that the
two sides in the negotiation period finalize the entire agreement on the future
UK/EU 27 relationship (with the consequence that no provisions on transition
would be needed), however that is for all practical purposes only a theoretical
possibility. In all likelihood the withdrawal agreement will only reflect the
framework of the future relationship and will define the provisions of transi-
tion that are to bridge with the aforesaid time gap between UK’s withdrawal
on the one hand and the new relationship on the other hand becoming
effective.
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Systematically speaking, our topic therefore has three sub-issues:
(i) What will be the effects from Brexit in the narrow sense, i.e. from UK’s
withdrawal as such? That is a question under existing law.
(ii) What will be the future relationship UK/EU 27 (Brexit effects in a wider
sense) the framework of which is to be taken into account in the with-
drawal arrangements? That is not a question of law but of political pro-
phecy.
(iii) What will be the provisions of transition in the agreement on the with-
drawal arrangements that are to bridge the aforesaid time gap – to put it
shortly – between UK withdrawal from EU and new relationship UK/
EU 27 becoming effective? This, too, is not a question of law but of
political prophecy.
When looking backwards on the public and media discussion since the Brexit
referendum of June 23, 2016, it is striking to note how little attention was given
to the aforesaid systematic differences. The discussion rather focused on afore-
said sub-issue (ii), with all sorts of models being suggested – UK membership
in the European Economic Area (EEA); UK/EU 27 association agreement like
in the case of Switzerland and Turkey; tailormade agreement in which many or
only very few provisions of the Treaties would be reflected and thereby would
become applicable in the future relationship; or a mere free trade agreement,
tailormade or standard type. Very little attention was given to the need for
transitional provisions, i.e. sub-issue (iii). It took quite a while until it was
realized that what is required, in particular on the part of responsible negotia-
tors of the UK and the EU 27 as well as on the part of businesses and citizens
that will all be affected by Brexit, is to deal, first of all, with sub-issue (i), i. the
question of what will be the Brexit effects in the narrow sense. That sub-issue is
so important because the Brexit effects in the narrow sense determine the basis
from which UK and EU 27 as well as businesses and citizens have to start the
reflection on their future course of action, and because the effects from Brexit
in the narrow sense will also be the Brexit effects in the wider sense if no
agreement at least on the framework of the future relationship UK/EU 27 is
found in the very short negotiation period for the agreement on the arrange-
ments of withdrawal.
II. Some remarks on the general effects of Brexit (in the narrow sense)
As already stated, the Treaties according to art. 50 para. 3 TFEU cease to apply
to the UK once the UK withdrawal has become effective. Thus in particular
the Treaty provisions on fundamental freedoms – free movement of goods,
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persons, services and capital – are no longer applicable to the UK. The Treaty
provisions on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are no
longer applicable either – the Court loses its jurisdiction over the UK, its
institutions and its corporate and physical citizens.
As regards the adoption of EU secondary law the UK after withdrawal will
not participate in the legislative process and will as a matter of principle be
outside the reach of such secondary law. EU law due to the territoriality
principle can bind businesses and citizens in other countries not on a per se
basis but only when their conduct produces effects within the EU.
Existing EU regulations for the aforesaid reasons cease to apply in the UK
except for those which deal with effects within the EU, e.g. theMerger Control
Regulation. Of course, the UK legislator, if it so wishes, may adopt UK
legislation that replicates the content of EU regulations which lose their effec-
tiveness in the UK.
Recommendations by the EU Commission also lose their applicability to the
UK because of the territoriality principle.
Existing EU directives, too, lose their effectiveness in the UK. However that
affects not UK businesses and citizens but only the UK itself as addressee of
the directive which the UK has to transpose into UK law. That obligation for
transposition where not yet complied with ceases to exist when UK with-
drawal from EU becomes effective. Claims that, according to CJEU case law
(Francovich et al.), UK businesses and citizens may be able to derive directly
from an untransposed however self fulfilling directive, cease to exist. The
withdrawal from the EUmeans that the UK is now free to decide whether UK
laws that transpose EU directives, shall remain in effect or not. A UK law that
has been adopted in order to transpose a EU directive and that remains in effect
post Brexit is no longer to be interpreted in the light of the underlying directive
which means that references to the CJEU for the interpretation of the directive
are no longer required.
As regards the UK’s decision on whether to continue UK laws for transposi-
tion of EU directives or not, a distinction between two categories of directives
may become relevant. The first category are directives that have no specific
cross-border content, such as the Directive on Domestic Mergers and the
Accounting Directives. The second category are directives that do have a
specific cross-border content, e.g. the Cross-border Merger Directive. UK
businesses and citizens can make cross-border use of these latter directives
only if the relevant EU 27 Member State of destination accepts such use after
the UK has withdrawn from the EU. Such recognition on the part of the
EU 27 Member States may in most cases be rather unlikely, and that fact may
induce the UK to at least modify its own law by introducing a reciprocity
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requirement which the UK would be free to do since it is no longer bound by
the EU Treaties. As far as directives without specific cross-border aspects are
concerned the UK may be inclined to continue the laws of transposition with-
out modification.
III. The effects of Brexit (in the narrow sense) on Company Law
The existence and recognition of companies in whichever form, corporate or
partnership, is governed by domestic law of a given state, both as regards
companies from such state or from other states. The pertinent laws on conflict
of laws to be found in Europe can generally speaking be characterized as
follows. The UK, the Netherlands and several other states follow the incor-
poration theory according to which it is the jurisdiction under which the
company has been established that is decisive. Other states, e.g. Germany and
Austria, follow the real seat theory according to which the controlling factor is
where the company is being managed. The incorporation theory (also referred
to as statutory seat theory) intends to give flexibility to the company (and its
shareholders/partners) to manage the business operation wherever they wish
and without effect therefrom on the legal status of the company. The purpose
of the real seat theory (also referred to as seat of management theory) is to
protect the creditors, the underlying assumption being that the highest number
of creditors is to be found where the company is being managed. The incor-
poration theory allows free movement of a company whereas the effects of the
real seat theory restrict free movement: A company incorporated under foreign
lawwith real seat in a real seat theory country is not recognized in such country
as a foreign company. Either the existence is not recognized at all or such
company is re-qualified by the real seat country as a general partnership, with a
consequence of unlimited personal liability of all partners. Vice versa, a domes-
tic company from a real seat theory country with real seat in a foreign country
loses its existence and is to be wound up in its home country of foundation
unless domestic law of such home country specifically permits the real seat to
be in another country as is the case with aGermanAG andGmbH since 2008.
In a nutshell and generally speaking there is no problem with free movement if
both countries involved follow the incorporation theory. However there is a
restriction of free movement whenever one country or both countries in-
volved follow the real seat theory. The case law of the CJEU (Centros,
Überseering, Inspire Art) has held that such restriction, if made by the country
of destination, violates the company’s fundamental right of establishment.
However, such case law becomes irrelevant once the Treaties are no longer
applicable to the UK. Thus, as between UK and EU 27 the restrictive effects
from the real seat theory become relevant again.
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This post-Brexit reactivation of the real seat theory will of course work in both
directions. However, in terms of numbers of companies affected there is a
considerable imbalance between UK and EU 27. The number of companies
with legal form under UK law and with real seat in a EU 27 Member State has
been determined to be ca. 100.000 with respect to 8 Member States1 for which
statistical data were available. Extrapolation from this figure leads to a total
figure of above 300.000 companies for all EU 27 Member States. These high
figures are evidence of the attractivity of UK law due to its greater flexibility, its
lower minimum capital requirements and the absence of employees’ participa-
tion on board level, to mention the most important reasons only. Compared
thereto the number of companies having their real seat in the UK and their
incorporation seat in a EU 27 Member State is insignificant, given the fact that
the company law of those EU 27 Member States generally speaking is less
flexible thanUK law.
Yet the fact that the fundamental freedom of establishment is no longer applic-
able in relation to the UK, has practical consequences, as mentioned before,
only for those out of the aforesaid 100.000 to above 300.000UK law companies
which have their legal seat in a EU 27 Member State that follows the real seat
theory such as Germany or Austria. In the aforesaid figure of ca. 100.000 as
determined for 8 countries, Germany alone accounts for over 60%. Thus, the
number of companies affected by the reactivation of the real seat theory is still
quite significant.
Owners and management of such companies so affected in order to be abso-
lutely on the safe side and in order not to be dependent on the outcome of the
negotiation of the future relationship UK/EU 27 and the provisions of transi-
tion in the withdrawal arrangements agreement, if any, will have to decide and
will have to bring implementation to full completion (!) prior to the UK’s with-
drawal becoming effective, what they want to do in order to avoid the aforesaid
negative consequences, inparticular thepersonal liability in the real seat country.
This could e.g. be achieved either by merging the company into a company
established under the law of the real seat country or of another EU 27 Member
State, in accordance with the Cross-border Merger Directive, or by converting
theUK law company into a company under the lawof the real seat country or of
another EU 27 Member State, in accordance with CJEU case law (Cartesio,
Vale). Such merger or transformation, as mentioned before, would have to
become effective in good time, i.e. prior to the effectiveness of the UK’s with-
drawal.Given the complexity of such corporatemeasures and the time they take
until effectiveness, the companies in question are leftwithnotmuch time.
1 Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain, with
data for 2011.
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If there is no completion prior to the effective date of the withdrawal the
companies in question are dependent on the future relationship UK/EU 27
and the provisions on transition in the withdrawal arrangements agreement
which owners and management will be unable to predict in good time before
having to get the process started and completed before the UK withdrawal
takes effect.
The aforesaid provisions on transition can be structured in various ways. One
way is to give timewise unlimited status quo recognition as offered by Prime
Minister Theresa May in her speech of January 17, 2017 to companies and
individuals from abroad with domicile in the UK. Such express recognition
would create legal certainty. That is important because it is uncertain whether
such status quo (or bona fides) protection already follows from intertemporal
law. An alternative would be to grant status quo protection for a defined
duration so as to give companies and citizens affected sufficient time, post
effectiveness of the UK withdrawal, to adjust to whatever will be the new UK/
EU 27 relationship or to the absence of an agreement thereon. Given their own
interests the EU 27 Member States will probably be prepared to grant such
status quo protection, unlimited or limited in time, to UK citizens and compa-
nies with domicile in EU 27 provided there is reciprocity. Yet, however high
that probability may be, there is no legal certainty.
IV. The effects of Brexit (in the narrow sense) on financial services
UK domiciled financial institutions presently enjoy EU passport rights where
provided in the relevant directives on financial services. That means in particu-
lar that their branches in another EU Member State do not require a local
license, nor equity capital of their own, nor risk management and controlling
systems of their own, and are subject to supervision by EU and UK authorities
only and not by local authorities of the other EUMember State in question. It
is for this reason that for all banks from all over the world, in particular from
the USA, London is the most important hub for activities in all of the EU. The
UK withdrawal from the EU will mean that these passport rights will go
away – the hub times will be over.
The dimension thereof is quite significant. There exist in Germany alone –
leaving aside the other EU 27 Member States – 19 branches from UK banks
and 69 branches from other UK financial institutions. Cross-border activities
from UK institutions into Germany in non-branch form are also covered by
EU passports. 740 UK banks and more than 2.900 other UK financial service
institutions engage in such non-branch activities into Germany. To these
numbers must be added the branches and non-branch operations that UK
banks and other financial institutions maintain in other EU Member States.
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This easily explains why the City of London was close to panic when the result
of the Brexit Referendum of June 23, 2016 became known – the number of
jobs in London in financial services plus ancillary legal, auditing and other
related services is about 700.000!
Some London banks and financial institutions have ventured the idea that
existing EU law, namely MIFIR II (Markets in Financial Instruments Regula-
tion of 2014) might help because it provides for the possibility of passport
rights for institutions from a third country which the UK would be after
withdrawal from the EU. However, such passport rights under MIFIR II are
tied to several conditions: (i) The EU Commission must have adopted a
decision to the effect that the legal and supervisory framework of the third
country in question provides for an effective system that is equivalent to that
of the EU. (ii) There must be in place a co-operation agreement between the
foreign supervisory authority and ESMA (European Security and Markets
Authority). (iii) The standards of supervision must be comparable.
These MIFIR II provisions have been modeled after a similar provision in the
Auditing Directive of 2006 which owe their existence to the SEC Auditors’
Independence Rule of 2003 which subjected to SEC registration requirements
and control foreign auditors that have opined on the financial statements of
companies that are listed in theUSA,orof a subsidiary companywhose financial
statements are submitted to the SEC by the parent company with listing in the
USA. The EU reacted by including in the Auditing Directive of 2006 a corre-
sponding provision on EU registration by, and EU control of, foreign auditors.
Both the SEC Auditors’ Independence Rule and the EU Auditing Directive
provide that the SEC on the one hand and the EU Commission on the other
handmaywaive the cross-border requirement of registration by, and control of,
foreign auditing firms once they find that there is the necessary equivalence on
the other side. Up to date such a recognition of equivalence and resultingwaiver
has not beenmade. This practical example shows that in all likelihoodMIFIR II
will not be suitable to mitigate the effects that will follow from the UK with-
drawal from the EU. In any case it must for all practicable purposes be ruled out
that such MIFIR II based third country passport rights will be in existence
alreadyon the effective date of thewithdrawal.
Apart from that, one must realize that banking transactions are not covered at
all by MIFIR II and that foreign exchange transactions are covered only if they
are conducted (i) from outside the EU (i.e. not through a physical presence
within the EU) and for professional customers and with suitable counter-
parties only. Thus the MIFIR II solution as devised by some London based
financial institutions would at best solve only some problems of some mem-
bers of the UK financial community and therefore cannot be regarded as an
escape from the Brexit effects in the narrow sense.
259The Effects of BrexitECFR 2/2017
Another idea ventured by financial circles in London has been to have a bilateral
free trade and mutual recognition agreement between the UK on the one hand
and a given EU Member State, e.g. Germany, on the other hand which would
allow for free movement of financial services and related labor and which could
be negotiated immediately so as to ideally become effective simultaneouslywith
the UK withdrawal from the EU. Such an agreement could be attractive for
Germany because German banks as a result of the UK withdrawal would lose
their EU passport rights in London. However, such idea is legally not feasible
and therefore cannot help to avoid the Brexit effects. Financial markets regula-
tion and supervision has become a matter of EU law, as evidenced by Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), European Central Bank (ECB), European
BankingAgency (EBA) andESMA.As a consequence, noEUMember State can
any longer conclude abilateral agreement in this field of activities.
Therefore the future relationship UK/EU 27 as regards financial services can
be dealt with not under existing EU law nor bilaterally between UK and a
given EU Member State but only in a new UK/EU 27 treaty. This explains
why a more recent proposal in the City of London, in order to find a substitute
for the disappearing EU passport rights, suggests that the UK should conclude
a new treaty with the EU whereby it would join the EU Banking Union by
submitting to the EBA and the SSM which would enable, as between UK and
EU 27, free movement of financial services and of persons working in financial
services. This proposal is, of course, sensible from a business view point for the
financial institutions in question, however political acceptability not only on
the part of the EU 27 but also on the part of the UK (before the background of
the promises made in the Brexit referendum campaign) is quite questionable.
In any case, this proposal is a matter for above sub-issue (ii), e.g. the future
UK/EU 27 relationship (Brexit effects in the wider sense).
V. The effects of Brexit (in the narrow sense) on legal services
The situation of legal services is different from the situation of financial
services. Under the Treaties UK law firms and lawyers at present enjoy the
fundamental cross-border freedoms of services and establishment in the EU.
Under secondary EU law (the Lawyers’ Service Directive of 1977 and the
Lawyers’ Establishment Directive of 1998) it is only the individual lawyer (and
not the law firm as such) that on the basis of his professional qualification and
professional title enjoys cross-border EU passport rights: EU lawyers, with
some very few and relatively unimportant exceptions, enjoy the same practice
rights as local lawyers. EU lawyers may practice in the other state (in and out
of courts) their own home country law, EU law and the foreign local law, and
they enjoy the same legal privilege / professional secrecy protection als local
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lawyers. As a consequence, UK law firms have in all EU Member States been
able to render legal services not only through local lawyers but also through
UK lawyers as if they were local lawyers. London on that basis has become the
center of legal services in Europe. The market position acquired by UK law
firms in some EU member states is probably even stronger than the position
held by UK financial institutions. In fact, UK law firms have strong, some-
times dominant positions in the high end business law market of several EU
Member States.
To give an idea of the economic importance of legal services exports from
London into other countries (i.e. without the volume of legal services rendered
by local offices in other countries), the UK in 2015 had a net export of legal
services to the rest of the world worth ₤ 3,6 billion, of which to the other EU
Member States legal services of ₤ 1,9 billion. The UK is the second largest legal
services market in the world and the largest legal services sector within the EU,
accounting for 10%of global legal services fee revenue and 20%of all European
fee revenue.According toEurostat the total value of theUK legal services sector
was almost three times the size of theGerman legal market and six times the size
of the French market which are the second and third largest European markets
respectively. The legal sector employs in London alone almost 110.000 people.
Lawyers and law firms in the UK and in particular in London have probably
been themajor beneficiaryofEuropean legalmarkets integration.
As regards the post-Brexit situation, EU secondary law on legal services has no
system of equivalence based recognition for lawyers from other countries. It is
rather up to each EU 27 Member State to decide how it wants to deal with
lawyers from the UK as a non-EU/EEA third country. The UK post Brexit
would only benefit from the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Most EU 27 Member States in that agreement permit lawyers from other
GATS member states to practice only their home country law and interna-
tional public law with the express exclusion of EU law. Practically all
EU 27 Member States have reserved the right to impose additional regulatory
restrictions. GATS does not provide at all for obligations to grant visa and
work permits, i.e. there is no free movement of persons.
Germany for instance permits foreign lawyers to practice inGermany only after
they have opened an office in Germany and have become a member of the local
bar. Legal services by non-EU foreign lawyers on a fly-in fly-out basis are in
most EU 27 Member States not permitted. There are many other regulatory
restrictions for foreign lawyers in effect in the EU 27 Member States, e.g. on
market access in general, court work, ability to open an office without involve-
ment of local lawyers, ability to form a partnership with local lawyers, etc. The
protection ofGATS lawyers’ legal privilege / professional secrecy is not ensured
in the EU 27 Member States. As a consequence, UK lawyers post Brexit can in
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many of the important EUMember States no longer practice EU and local law
as before throughUK lawyers. Another Brexit consequence in the narrow sense
will be that UK lawyers lose their right to represent clients before the European
Courts, before the EU Intellectual PropertyOffice and before theEUCommis-
sion in competition law investigations. UK lawyers can of course advise clients
on such matters, however their legal privilege / professional secrecy would be
protected not at all under EU law and under EU 27 Member State law only to
the extent granted by the relevant EU 27 Member State.
As a result, services rendered by UK law firms pre Brexit through UK lawyers
can post Brexit be rendered only through local EU 27 lawyers whom the firms
take on board as partners or employees, provided that is permitted in such
state. Italy, for instance, prohibits the employment of an Italian lawyer by no
matter whom, including employment by other Italian or foreign lawyers.
In order to preserve their EU passport rights, some UK lawyers on the basis of
their UK qualification are taking out an Irish solicitor qualification. Yet, the
Lawyers’ Service Directive and the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive give EU
passport rights to a lawyer with qualification of a EU Member State only if he
is an EU citizen. UK citizenship post Brexit will not meet this requirement so
that an Irish qualification cannot ensure EU passport rights for UK citizens
and cannot help to escape the Brexit effects in the narrow sense.
What has been stated above with respect to the loss of EU passport rights as
regards outbound legal services from the UK into the EU applies, of course,
also the other way round, for outbound legal services from the EU into the
UK – EU law firms and lawyers lose their rights under EU primary and
secondary law. However, national UK law is quite different from the national
laws of most EU Member States insofar as it permits everyone, from the UK
or from another country, to practice any kind of law in the UK provided that it
is not done under a UK title, in particular the title of a solicitor. This is quite a
different approach to the issue – it imposes qualification requirements not for
the service as such but rather for the UK title under which the service is
rendered, the understanding being that the client will realize from the absence
of title that he cannot expect a service with the quality of a duly qualified UK
title holder, e. g. solicitor. A lawyer from a EU Member State when practicing
in the UK legal market under his home country title, does not practice under
the title of an English solicitor, therefore his market access is not restricted
under existing UK law.
As a consequence, the post-Brexit situation when comparing cross-border
possibilities of UK lawyers on the one hand and EU lawyers on the other hand
is rather imbalanced – the possibility of cross-border services by UK lawyers
is severely reduced whereas the possibilities of services by EU lawyers into the
UKwill not be affected.
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This imbalance could induce the UK to establish an equal level trading field for
bilateral treaty negotiations by changing its existing law in the direction that
the presently unlimited market access and practice rights of lawyers from
other countries are, in one way or another, restricted as far as EU lawyers are
concerned, so as to establish an equal level restriction field as between UK and
EU 27. Yet, such measure would in all likelihood constitute an illegal discrimi-
nation under GATS. If so the UK could escape the discrimination only by
changing its present law also with respect to lawyers also from countries other
than the EU 27 Member Stateswhichwouldmean, the restrictions apply also to
lawyers from Commonwealth Countries and the USA – a sacrifice for the legal
professionwhichwould politically be extremely difficult to accept in theUK.
The UK may instead be inclined, as has been discussed above in connection
with financial services, to enter into a bilateral agreement with one or more
EU 27 Member States, preferably to become effective together with the UK’s
EU withdrawal, which would give reciprocal recognition to qualified lawyers
from either side. Unlike in the case of financial services as discussed above,
each of the EU 27 Member States would be competent to enter into such an
agreement, due to the fact that regulation of the legal profession has not been
unionized. An example for such a bilateral agreement would be the agreement
between Portugal and Brazil (a former Portuguese colony). However, the
practice rights granted by such a bilateral agreement would of course be
limited to the signatory states, i.e. would not extent to other EU 27 Member
States – in the case of the aforesaid agreement Portugal / Brazil Brazilian
lawyers may practice in Portugal but not in the other EU Member States.
Therefore one or several such bilateral agreements would not really help the
UK legal profession to escape from the Brexit effects in the narrow sense.
Apart from that, such a bilateral agreement would in all likelihood not be
attractive for any EU 27 Member State as long as lawyers from EU 27 already
under UK law have the right to practice in the UK under their home title.
It is worth noting that what has been stated above on the effects of Brexit (in
the narrow sense) in company law is relevant for those law firms from EU 27
that have chosen a UK legal form while having their real seat in their home
country. The legal form so used is very rarely a corporate form (company
limited by shares or company with limited liability), in most cases it is a
Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) which like a corporation offers the advan-
tage of full protection of shareholders against personal liability for all liabilities
(professional and others) while offering for tax purposes in many countries the
transparent status of a partnership which means in the case of Germany for
instance that the profits of the law firm are not subject to German trade income
tax and are taxed only at the level of the partners and not, prior thereto, at the
level of the firm itself. Those companies and LLPs established under UK law
that have their real seat in a EU 27 Member State that follows the real seat
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theory, will be affected by the Brexit consequences in the narrow sense, as
discussed above. They will lose their protection against personal liability
because they will be re-qualified as a general partnership with unlimited
personal liability of all its partners. I am not aware of statistical data of how
many EU 27 LLPs would be so affected. However, for Germany alone my
estimate is between 50 and 100, which includes some significant players in the
German legal market. For the avoidance of doubt it should be mentioned that
this does not concern those LLPs which have their real seat in the UK, such as
London based LLPs in which UK and German law firms have joined forces by
merger in one way or another.
VI. Outlook
The aforesaid is a summary overview of the Brexit effects in the narrow sense
in company law and in financial and legal services only. If one wants to have
the full picture of said Brexit effects then one would have to do a similar
analysis for all the other fields and sectors of law and activities that are
presently covered by the immense body of EU law that by now deals with
almost all aspects of business and private life. Needless to say that such analysis
is a gigantic task. Yet such task needs to be done if one wants to have a full
answer to sub-issue (i) above (Brexit effects in the narrow sense) as a basis for
properly dealing with sub-issues (ii) and (iii) (future relationship UK/EU 27
and provisions of transition). It is of course impossible to predict which answer
UK and EU 27 will give to those two issues. Yet it is evident that work on
these two issues again is a gigantic task.
Such work could be significantly facilitated if UK and EU 27 were to use as
model a legal structure that is in use already in another context, such as the
European Economic Area (EEA). Full EEA membership of UK would mean
(i) all four fundamental freedoms of mobility will continue to apply to the UK,
(ii) many parts of EU secondary law will continue to apply to the UK, (iii) UK
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the EEA Court of Justice, (iv) the UK
would have no seat in the Commission, the Council and the Parliament of the
EU as law making bodies also for the EEA, and (v) the UKwould nevertheless
have to make significant payments, like e.g. Norway does, into the EU budget.
Another model could be the Switzerland/EU Association Agreements which
also cover the mobility of persons and provide for financial payments into the
EU budget, or one of the other Association Agreements of the EU with e.g.
Turkey and Ukraine which go less far.
Into these categories falls also the proposal by Bruegel, a Belgian think-tank,
of a new special “Continental Partnership” under which the UK would make
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financial contributions to the EU 27 for obtaining one way access to certain
EU markets, in particular financial services. Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the chair of
the Euro zone, has commented on this proposal (and on others going into
similar directions) by stating: “We can’t allow the financial service center for
Europe and the Euro zone to be outside Europe and to go its own way in
terms of rules and regulations.” It is obvious that the Bruegel proposal intends
to cater for the interests of the London financial community. If all the sectors
of industry and services were to have their way in the same direction then the
UKwould more or less stay within the EU.
At the other end of the spectrumwould be a simple free trade agreement.
Relevant for the decision on format and substance of the new relationship UK/
EU 27 may also be the relevant majority requirement. It is clear that the
agreement UK/EU 27 on the arrangements of withdrawal (sub-issue (ii))
according to Art. 50 para 2 TFEU requires a qualified majority on the part of
the EU Council, i.e. at least 55% of the number of Member States which must
represent at least 65% of the total EU population. The situation is less clear as
regards the future relationship UK/EU 27. Depending on format and sub-
stance qualified majority in the EU Council may not be sufficient and unani-
mity on the part of all Member States may rather be required.
Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, in her speech of January 12, 2017 has
put an end to all such theoretical discussions about the format of the future
relationship by stating that UK wants to stick to the Brexit campaign promises
(take back control on immigration, re-establish sovereignty of UK legislator
and judiciary). This in particular rules out UK EEA membership. There is,
however, one fact of law in this context that is often overlooked, namely that
UK already now is a member of EEA, namely in its capacity as a EU 28 Mem-
ber State, i.e. not in a stand-alone capacity like Norway which is EEAmember
without EU 28 membership. The fact, that UK already is a EEA member has
led pro single market think tank British Influence to argue that UK’s member-
ship in the EU is separate from the membership in the EEA, and that the EEA
membership must be brought to an end in accordance with art. 127 EEA
Treaty, i.e. separately from the withdrawal from EU under art. 50 TFEU.
British Influence argues in this context that the EEAwithdrawal, just like the
EU withdrawal for which that has been held in the Miller case by the High
Court of London and the UK Supreme Court, requires Parliamentary assent
which to grant or to deny Parliament, in comparison to the EU withdrawal,
might have greater political freedom given the fact that the Brexit referendum
did not address EEA membership. British Influence has brought the matter
before the High Court of London which is expected to hear the case in early
February 2017. The case seems to be more complicated than the Miller case on
Parliamentary assent before notification of withdrawal fromEU, due to the fact
265The Effects of BrexitECFR 2/2017
that the British Influence case involving EEA membership concerns not only
the requirement of prior Parliamentary assent which is a question of UK law,
but also the question of whether UK’s membership in EEA automatically
expires with the withdrawal of UK from EU as UK Government pretends, or
whether it continues unless separately terminated by UK (with separate Parlia-
mentary assent) as held by British Influence which is a question of EEA law
and maybe also of EU law which may require a reference to the EEA and / or
EUCourt of Justice.
Theresa May, according to her speech of January 12, 2017, is aiming at a “new,
comprehensive, bold and ambitious Free Trade Agreement which may take in
elements of current Single Market Arrangements in certain areas, on the export
of cars and lorries for example or the freedom to provide financial services
across national borders”. The “new, comprehensive, bold and ambitious Free
Trade Agreement” of Theresa May resembles the Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement between EU and Canada (CETA EU/Canada). The
practical and legal difficulties with that agreement have been tremendous. It
took about six years to negotiate CETA EU/Canada, and the legal difficulties
in the end turned out to be significant due to the fact that under the EU Treaties
the EU had authority to act on its own not on all matters involved; there were
some matters in CETA EU/Canada, where the authority to regulate, or even
the authority to conclude the treaty, vests with the EUMember States which is
why the German Constitutional Court excluded certain parts of CETA EU/
Canada from immediate provisional application. In the case of Belgium, the
need for member state level approval meant that the independent provinces,
too, had to give their approval which approval at first was refused by the
parliament of Wallonia. This means in a nutshell that for those parts of CETA
EU 27/UK that are within the regulatory competency not of the EU as such
but of the EU 27 Member States, unanimity of all EU 27 Member States will
be required, and Member States approval according to national law may mean
that sub-entities of a given Member State must also give their approval. In
summary, the CETA EU 27/UK envisaged by Prime Minister Theresa May
will be a very time consuming and very difficult task to achieve.
Finally, it should be remembered that several other issues directly or indirectly
connected must also be addressed. One – certainly controversial – issue is the
settlement of mutual financial claims in the range of up to € 100 billion (out-
standing and future EU payments into running projects in the UK, and vice
versa outstanding and future payments by UK into the EU budget). The issue
of permanent status quo protection for UK businesses and citizen in EU and
vice versa has already beenmentioned above.Another issue concerns the special
situation in Irelandwhere in particular free access andmobility betweenNorth-
ern Ireland (as part of the UK) and the Republic of Ireland (as continuing
EU 27 Member State) is at stake.Here, however, a solution should be possible if
266 Hans-Jürgen Hellwig ECFR 2/2017
one remembers that based on a special agreement between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the European Economic Community (EEC), the former Ger-
manDemocratic Republic (DDR)was treated as part of the Federal Republic of
Germany as regards tariffs and quotas etc., with the consequence, that theDDR
indirectly became a member of the EEC – goods from the DDR could freely be
imported into the Federal Republic of Germany and exported on to other EEC
Member States.
As regards the forthcoming negotiations, many views have been expressed on
the relative strength and weakness of the negotiating position of the UK on the
one hand and the EU 27 and their Member States on the other hand, all based
on the absolute and relative size of mutual exports and imports in goods and
services. In my mind that purely quantitative approach is questionable. Deci-
sive is not the volume of goods and services traded but rather the importance
of the goods and services in question for the two sides. Generally speaking the
UK economy as a consequence of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s politics
has a quite high concentration on services in general and in financial (and to a
smaller extent legal) services in particular while industrial production (coal,
steel, chemicals, textiles etc.) has become relatively unimportant. Compared
thereto the economic structure of EU 27 at large and of many EU 27 Member
States appears better balanced and therefore less vulnerable. Another qualita-
tive aspect is the existing division of production and services between the UK
and EU 27. A production company from either side may be highly or entirely
dependent on the import of certain specialized parts and components from the
other side – quantitatively speaking the trade volume in question may be quite
low, qualitatively speaking such trade may have essential importance for con-
tinuing production and continuing cost structures. Sheer trading volume fig-
ures say nothing about such dependencies.
There is finally another difficulty that the UK must cope with in addition to
the difficulty of negotiating with EU 27 the “new, comprehensive, bold and
ambitious Free Trade Agreement” envisaged by UK, namely that UKwill have
to negotiate free trade agreements with countries around the world which are
to replace the approx. 150 free trade agreements of the EU to which the UK
will no longer be a party as another effect from Brexit in the narrow sense. The
negotiating power of the UK in such negotiations will be considerably smaller
than the negotiating power of the EU in its free trade agreements around the
world. To give an example, South Korea in the free trade agreement with the
EU made concessions in financial services so important to the UK because
Germany was prepared to permit a higher import volume of cars from South
Korea. This EU wide trade-off possibility will no longer be available to the
UK when negotiating on a stand-alone basis a free trade agreement with other
countries.
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